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COMMENT
PUEBLO INDIAN WATER RIGHTS:
OVERVIEW AND UPDATE ON THE
AAMODT LITIGATION
INTRODUCTION
This comment is an update on the ongoing litigation concerning the
water rights of the Nambe, Tesuque, Pojoaque and San Ildefonso Indian
Pueblos. This litigation was intended to take the lead for purposes of
determining the controlling law for Pueblo Indian water rights in general.
Because of the extensive irrigable acreage on Pueblo lands, and the fact
that the surface waters of the Rio Grande River have been fully appro-
priated since about 1900, the final resolution of these issues could dra-
matically affect all New Mexico water users.
This litigation began in 1966, and reportedly is the oldest active case
today in the federal courts. The initial decision of the United States District
Court was reversed in 1976 on an interlocutory appeal to the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals.' The Supreme Court at that time declined to review
the Tenth Circuit's ruling. The district court reached a second preliminary
decision in 1985 and again certified its opinion for interlocutory appeal.'
Initially the court of appeals did not act on the second interlocutory order.
However, after a renewed petition by the Pueblos to hear the appeal, the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals denied the petition in December 1987.
Before any further appeals are heard, the district court will have to reach
a final decision, an event estimated to be about two years away.
Since the district court published its 1985 opinion, the court has also
written a number of unpublished memorandum opinions addressing details
beyond the scope of the 1985 published opinion. These unpublished
memoranda raise new unanticipated sub-issues which will require exten-
sive briefing and hearings before they are resolved. Some parties assert
that these new opinions are inconsistent with the 1985 opinion. At this
point there is little agreement among the parties on precisely what basic
issues have been decided by the court to date.
I intend to briefly review both the 1976 Aamodt I and the 1985 Aamodt
11 opinions and some of the short memorandum opinions subsequently
written by Judge Mechem. The unpublished opinions help to explain the
1. New Mexico v. Aamodt, 537 F.2d 1102 (10th Cir. 1976) [Aamodt 11, cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1121 (1977).
2. State ex rel. Reynolds v. Aamodt, 618 F. Supp. 993 (D.N.M. 1985) [Aamodt Il].
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1985 opinion. The 1976 Court of Appeals opinion suggests how that court
may view the final decision of the district court on appeal.
I do not intend to extensively discuss all of the background legal
doctrines and case precedents which are involved in this suit: for instance
the Winters doctrine. Instead I will carefully set out the factual and legal
events that lead up to this litigation, focus on the issues that are involved
in the suit, and then examine the legal opinions to see how the courts
have attempted to resolve those issues. Finally, I will briefly consider
how this litigation might affect other Pueblo water rights adjudications
presently in their early stages.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND ON THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE
PUEBLO INDIANS TO THE UNITED STATES
The Pueblos, an aboriginal Indian tribe of the Southwest, have practiced
extensive irrigated agriculture in New Mexico for 1,000 years or more.'
The Spanish entered the middle and upper Rio Grande valley in 1540
under Coronado but soon withdrew again to Mexico. The first Spanish
governor of the territory, Onate, arrived in 1598 and administered the
area as part of Spain's colonial enterprise.4 Due to the tenuous hold by
the government on this distant part of the Spanish realm, the Pueblos
were incorporated into the colonial scheme in a manner which contrasted
sharply with Spanish treatment of Indians in other parts of Mexico.5 After
taking oaths of allegiance to the Spanish Crown, the Pueblos, in general,
were able to remain on their aboriginal land to continue their agricultural
way of life. This remained true after the people of Mexico were able to
break away from the dominion of Spain and establish themselves as a
free and independent republic in 1821.
Following the cession of Texas from the Republic of Mexico, the United
States declared war on Mexico and invaded and seized control of New
Mexico in 1846. At the conclusion of the war, the Republic of Mexico
ceded territory, which included New Mexico, in the Treaty of Guadalupe
Hildalgo. 6 Article VIII of that treaty obliged the United States to protect
the property rights of Mexican citizens in the ceded territory who chose
to remain and become citizens of the United States.
In 1854, Congress instructed the Surveyor General to investigate all
claims to land under the laws of Spain and Mexico, including those of
the Pueblos. In 1858, Congress acted favorably on the recommendations
of the Surveyor General and confirmed the land claims of 17 Indian
3. I F. HODGE, HANDBOOK OF AMERICAN INDIANS NORTH OF MEXICO 26 (1965).
4. M. JENKINS & A. SCHROEDER, A BRIEF HISTORY OF NEW MEXICO 13-20 (1974).
5. H. PECKMAN, C. GIBSON, ATTITUDES OF COLONIAL POWERS TOWARD THE AMERICAN INDIAN
123-27 (1969).
6. Treaty of Guadalupe Hildalgo, Feb. 2, 1848, United States-Mexico, 9 Stat. 922, T.S. No.
207.
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Pueblos, including the 4 involved in Aamodt I & IL' The United States
issued federal patents, in the form of quitclaim deeds on the part of the
United States, to each Indian Pueblo which received thereby a communal
fee simple title. The influx of settlers into New Mexico after the war
created a growing pressure for Pueblo land. In a number of instances
tribal leaders conveyed away tribal land. The legality of these transactions
was questionable. This was aboriginal Pueblo land and the United States
Supreme Court established very early in Johnson v. M'Intosh8 that only
the United States could extinguish the original Indian title to Indian
aboriginal land; direct transfers to private citizens would not convey a
valid title.9
Johnson v. M'Intosh was essentially codified in the Indian Trade and
Intercourse Act of 1834.0 This Act provided that no purchase, grant,
lease, or conveyance of land from any Indian nation or tribe of Indians
was of any validity in law or equity unless the United States was a party
to the transaction. Shortly after taking control of the territory in the
Mexican cession, Congress, in 1851, extended the provisions of the 1834
Act to the Indians of New Mexico.'" The extension, however, did not
explicitly mention the Pueblo Indians and their lands. The scope of the
1851 Act was limited to "Indians" within the new territory.
In the late 1860s the United States sought to invoke provisions of the
1834 Act to protect Pueblo land against trespass. Under the 1834 Act
unauthorized settlement of tribal lands was a federal offense. However,
the Supreme Court of the Territory of New Mexico found the Act in-
applicable to the Pueblos in United States v. Lucero. 2 The court distin-
guished the peaceful industrious Pueblos, who had been given United
States citizenship (although the territorial legislature had in 1854 removed
their right to vote), from other North American- aborigines-wild wan-
dering savages whose commerce was intended to be regulated by the
Indian Trade and Intercourse Act of 1834. After the similar 1874 decision
of United States v. Joseph,' the United States appealed to the United
7. Act of Dec. 22, 1858, ch. 5, I1 Stat. 374.
8. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
9. In the mid-nineteenth century it was mostly assumed, and is still asserted today, that the Indians
who occupied the territory ceded from Mexico had no claim to land based upon original Indian title.
It was argued that neither Spain nor Mexico recognized original Indian title, so any title the Indians
may have had at one time had been extinguished by the previous sovereigns. The United States,
therefore, acquired these lands unencumbered by aboriginal title. See, e.g., Hayt v. United States,
38 Ct. Cl. 455, 460-62 (1903). The non-Indian defendants in the Aamodt litigation argue a variant
of this proposition; they argue that whatever original Indian title the Pueblos may have had at one
time was extinguished in 1858 when Congress confirmed the Pueblo grants. Petition for Interlocutory
Appeal of certain Non-Indian Defendants at 12 (filed Oct. 1, 1985), New Mexico v. Aamodt, No.
6639.
10. Act of June 30, 1834, ch. 161, § 12, 4 Stat. 729.
II. Act of Feb. 27, 1851, ch. 14, § 7, 9 Stat. 574, 578.
12. I N.M. 422 (1869).
13. Id. at 442, 445.
14. 1 N.M. 593 (1874), aft-d, 94 U.S. 614 (1876).
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States Supreme Court, which affirmed the decision of the territorial court
offering reasons similar to those in Lucero.
After the Joseph decision Pueblo lands would have only the protection
of territorial law, subject to various common law defenses such as adverse
possession. The effect of this was the transfer, by sale or quiet title suits,
of considerable Pueblo land to non-Indians. As much as 80 percent of
the grant lands of certain Pueblos eventually found its way into non-
Indian ownership. ".
While the Supreme Court in Joseph declined to extend the protection
of federal guardianship over the Pueblos, it is fair to say that Congress
did not necessarily agree with the Court that the Pueblos were to have a
legal status distinct from the status of other Indian tribes. This conclusion
is suggested by numerous Congressional acts between 1851 and the turn
of the century. For example, shortly after the Lucero decision, which
among other things questioned the authority of the Indian Department to
appoint a Pueblo Indian agent, Congress itself in 1872 established a
Pueblo Indian Agency in New Mexico under the direction of the federal
government. 6 Following the Joseph decision, Congress appropriated funds
for various agricultural and educational projects for the"civilization and
instruction of the Pueblo Indians of New Mexico."' 7 In 1904, Congress
quickly nullified an attempt by the territory of New Mexico to impose
taxes on Pueblo lands.'" All of the above mentioned Congressional acts
show an intention to assume the role of federal guardianship over the
Pueblos, to regard them no differently than other Indian tribes.' 9
With the admission of the territory to statehood, Congress had an
opportunity to clarify the relationship of the Pueblos to the United States
in the New Mexico Enabling Act of 1910.2 The Act provided that the
15. C. DUMARS, M. O'LEARY & A. UTrON, PUEBLO INDIAN WATER RIGHTS: STRUGGLE FOR A
PRECIOUS RESOURCE 56 (1984) [hereinafter PUEBLO WATER RIGHTS].
16. Act of May 29, 1872, 17 Stat. 165.
17. Eg., Act of May 17, 1882, 22 Stat. 68 (substantially repeated in subsequent Indian Department
appropriation Acts).
18. Act of March 3, 1905, 33 Stat. 1048, 1069.
19. An intention to extend the protection of federal law over Pueblo land is most clearly seen in
the case of the Zuni Pueblo. Congress acted unilaterally to set aside their lands as a designated
Indian reservation. The Zuni Pueblos had ignored the Surveyor General and the grant confirmation
process. The United States simply set aside the reservation by the Executive Order in 1877. Exec.
Order of March 13, 1877, 1 Kappler 880. The creation of the Zuni reservation by Executive Order
suggests that the existence of the Spanish grants, although perhaps fortuitous, was not a determinative
factor in Congressional recognition of Pueblo land claims.
Many years later Congress directed the Secretary of the Interior to survey lands held by the Zuni
Indians and issue a patent to them of the same form issued for other Pueblo Indian grants. Act of
March 3, 1931, 46 Stat. 1509. Because the Zuni Indian reservation was unequivocally established
by Executive Order the Zunis are one band of Pueblos with a straightforward claim to the full benefit
of federally reserved water rights. The question of immemorial priority, or the recognition of two
priority dates quantified by two different standards (perhaps historic uses and then the remaining
irrigable acreage), would seem to be the only real issues.
20. Act of June 20, 1910, 36 Stat. 557.
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people of New Mexico disclaimed all right to land owned by any Indian
or Indian tribe which had acquired title from the United States or any
previous sovereign, and further provided that these lands were under the
absolute jurisdiction and control of Congress.2 The Enabling Act con-
tained a specific provision that "the terms 'Indian' and 'Indian Country'
shall include the Pueblo Indians of New Mexico and the lands now owned
or occupied by them."" The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality
of the latter provision, which asserted federal guardianship over the Pueb-
los, in United States v. Sandoval.23 The Court recanted its earlier views
concerning the Pueblos, attributing them to misinformation. More im-
portantly, the Court took note of the longstanding actions of the legislative
and executive departments regarding the Pueblos, and acknowledged the
final authority of Congress to determine the extent of federal guardianship
over distinctly Indian communities.
The Sandoval decision clouded the land title of every citizen in New
Mexico who occupied Pueblo Indian grant land. Subsequent legal pro-
ceedings challenging those land titles, so long thought to be valid, were
resisted in every possible way.24 The citizens of New Mexico applied to
Congress for relief and Congress responded with the Pueblo Lands Act
of 1924.5 The Act established a "Pueblo Lands Board" which had the
authority to quiet title within the boundaries of Pueblo grant land. Either
continuous adverse possession with color of title since 1902, or without
color of title since 1898, would validate non-Indian land claims.26 The
Act also provided that the Pueblos were to be reimbursed for the fair
market value of all lands and water rights lost pursuant to action taken
by the Pueblo Lands Board.27
The Pueblo Lands Board in fixing the awards for compensation, how-
ever, disregarded the appraised values ascertained by its own board of
appraisers and adopted a maximum figure of $35 per acre for agricultural
lands with water rights.28 This figure represented about one third of the
true market value. Dissatisfied with the inadequate awards and unable to
obtain relief in the courts, the Pueblos pressured Congress for additional
21. Id. at § 2, 36 Stat. at 559.
22. Id. at § 2, 36 Stat. at 560.
23. 231 U.S. 28 (1913) (holding that Pueblo grant lands are Indian Country for purposes of Indian
liquor control laws).
24. H. BRAYER, PUEBLO INDIAN LAND GRANTS OF THE "RIO ABAJO," NEW MEXICO 26 (1939).
25. Act of June 7, 1924, 43 Stat. 636.
26. Id. at § 4, 43 Stat. at 637.
27. Id. at § 6, 43 Stat. at 637-38.
28. H.R. REP. No. 123, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 2-3 (1933). The awards made to the non-Indians,
in contrast, were not limited by a maximum value and were substantially in compliance with the
recommendations of the board of appraisers. Id. It is generally recognized that the Pueblo Lands
Board had a definite "pro-settler" bias; also, there is some suggestion that the Board feared that
large awards to Pueblos would not be approved by the budget minded Coolidge administration.
PUEBLO WATER RIGHTS, supra note 15, at 72-73.
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compensation. The departure of the Lands Board from the purpose of the
1924 Act was defended in Congress upon a theory that the Pueblos had
not lost the water rights appurtenant to the lands which were lost.2 9
Congress was for some time generally unable to resolve these issues.
Then with the advent of the new administration of Franklin Delano Roose-
velt, Congress passed the 1933 Pueblo Compensation Act"° with a flood
of other social legislation in the heady "first Hundred days" of the New
Deal. The legislative report which accompanied the 1933 Act rejected
the "erroneous" theory that the low awards were justified because the
Pueblos had lost no water rights. The report recommended passage of
the Act which would raise the level of compensation to the Pueblos to
the full fair market value of lost land and water rights, based upon the
earlier values submitted by the board of appraisers."a
The 1933 Act directed that these funds, in the amount of $761,954,
would be used to purchase land and water rights to replace those which
had been lost, or to construct new irrigation works upon Pueblo land. 2
The 1933 Act also contained an appropriation of $232,086 to compensate
good faith settlers of Pueblo land who were unable to sustain their land
claims before the Pueblo Lands Board.33
Hopefully this explanation of the events leading up to the present day
water rights controversy makes a complex factual setting more under-
standable. In summary, the Pueblos are an Indian tribe in whom the
United States recognized the legal right to the continued occupation of
their aboriginal territory, not by treaty, Executive Order, or Congressional
legislation recognizing that territory as an "Indian reservation," but in-
stead by granting the tribe a federal patent to their aboriginal land pursuant
to a treaty obligation with another sovereign. Courts now recognize,
however, that the Pueblos have precisely the same guardian-ward rela-
tionship with the United States as any other Indian tribe, and that the
United States established this trust relationship with the Pueblos as early
as 185 1,' notwithstanding the Supreme Court's temporary misinterpre-
29. H.R. REP. No. 123, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1933); see also, Aamodt 1, 537 F.2d at 1109-
to.
30. Act of May 31, 1933, 48 Stat. 108.
31. H.R. REP. No. 123, 73d Cong., lst Sess., 3 (1933).
32. Act of May 31, 1933, § 1-2, 48 Stat. 108.The water rights associated with these replacement
lands, or the irrigation works constructed pursuant to the 1933 Act, are still very much at issue
today in the Aamodt litigation.
33. Id. at § 3, 48 Stat. at 109.
34. See United States v. Candelaria, 271 U.S. 432, 442 (1926) ("difficult to believe that Congress
in 1851 was not intending to protect them"); Pueblo of Santa Ana v. Mountain States Tel., 734 F.2d
1402, 1405 (10th Cir. 1984) (presumably the Nonintercourse Act "always had applied" to the
Pueblos), rev'd on other grounds, 472 U.S. 237 (1985). A guardian or trust relationship between
the United States and an Indian tribe can be based solely on the Nonintercourse Act whether or not
Congress has recognized a tribe for any other purposes. Joint Tribal Council of Passamaquoddy
Tribe v. Morton, 528 F.2d 370 (Ist Cir. 1975).
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tation of Congressional intent in this regard. Still, because of the ambig-
uous manner by which the United States recognized Pueblo land rights,
establishing the legal basis of Pueblo water rights has been complicated
by the difficulty of applying federal reserved water rights doctrine to their
situation. In addition, the history of the loss of land and water rights
within the original Pueblo grants, and the subsequent legislation which
sought to effect a compromise between the land claims of the non-Indians
and the Pueblos, have further compounded the difficulties in determining
the extent of Pueblo water rights.
Between 1924 and 1933, Congress shared this uncertainty concerning
the basis and extent of Pueblo Indian water rights. There was much debate
in Congress at the time concerning these water rights although the two
Acts which were passed during that time for the most part remained silent
on the matter. The 1924 Pueblo Lands Act assumes appurtenant water
rights were lost by the Pueblos, and by inference were gained by non-
Indians when those non-Indians were able to quiet title to Pueblo land.
The 1933 Pueblo Compensation Act took into account the value of lost
appurtenant water rights in computing the compensation due the Pueblos.
Finally, in section 9 of the 1933 Act, Congress attempted to safeguard
whatever existing water rights the Pueblos may have had at that time.
During Congressional hearings Senators Bratton and Cutting of New
Mexico asserted that the Pueblos were entitled to no preferential right to
water. In response, a representative of the Secretary of the Interior pro-
posed an amendment, adopted as Section 9 of the 1933 Act, which
recognized a prior right to the use of water for domestic, stockwatering,
and irrigation purposes for lands remaining in Indian ownership."
Another factor which further compounds the difficulties in ascertaining
the Pueblos' water rights under federal law is disagreement between
commentators on the legal theory underlying the Indian reserved water
rights cases growing out of Winters v. United States.36 One group asserts
the aboriginal right to the use of water which was never relinquished,
and therefore was reserved, by the Indian tribe; another group regards
the critical element to be the intention of the United States to reserve the
35. Act of May 31, 1933, §9. 48 Star. 108, I11. Which provided:
Nothing herein contained shall in any manner be construed to deprive any of the Pueblo
Indians of a prior right to the use of water from streams running through or bordering
on their respective pueblos for domestic, stock-water, and irrigation purposes for the
lands remaining in Indian ownership, and such water rights shall not be subject to loss
by nonuse or abandonment thereof as long as title to said lands shall remain in the
Indians.
36. 207 U.S. 564 (1908). in Winters the United States sought to enjoin upstream diversions from
the Milk River which threatened a new irrigation project on the Fort Belknap Reservation. The Court
held that a water right in the Milk River was implicitly reserved to the Indians in the 1888 agreement
which established the reservation. Id. at 575-77. Winters defined the basic theory of reserved water
rights for Indian reservations: that when the federal government established an Indian reservation,
the government, by implication, reserved sufficient water, then unappropriated, to accomplish the
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waters for the purpose of securing to the tribe the means of adapting to
an agricultural way of life, or at a minimum just to make the reservation
liveable." In most situations both of these elements will be present at
the same time. If one is missing, it will be the right to the use of water
based upon original Indian title because a tribe was moved to a new
reservation outside of their aboriginal territory. In that situation, where
the tribe lacked a claim to a reserved right based upon original Indian
use and occupation, it is doubtful anyone would conclude that the tribe
in question did not have an implied reserved water right. The right to the
use of waters then available for appropriation would be inferred from the
purpose of the United States in settling that tribe on the particular federal
Indian reservation.38 However, in the case of the Pueblos, while the tribe
continues to occupy their aboriginal territory and continues to exercise
whatever rights to the use of water that entails the alternate element, the
intention of the federal government to reserve the water for the use of
the tribe is arguably missing. Thus, the applicability of the reserved water
rights cases is problematic.
PUEBLO INDIAN WATER RIGHTS LITIGATION
The litigation in State of New Mexico v. Aamodt began in 1966 when
the New Mexico State Engineer brought suit in federal court to adjudicate
the water rights of all water users in the Rio Tesuque and Rio Nambe
river systems. This joined about 1,000 non-Indian water users and the
Nambe, Tesuque, Pojoaque and San Ildefonso Indian Pueblos. The district
federal purpose, which was to establish the tribe in a settled, likely agricultural and hopefully self-
sufficient way of life. See id. at 576; United States v. Finch, 548 F.2d 822, 832 (9th Cir. 1972),
rev'd on other grounds, 433 U.S. 676 (1977). The tribe received an allotment of water necessary
to "make the reservation livable" with a priority date effective on the date the reservation was
created. Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 616 (1983).
The initial Arizona decision in 1963 also recognized that the principle underlying the reservation
of waters for Indian reservations was equally applicable to other federal enclaves. See Arizona v.
California, 373 U.S. 546, 601 (1963) (National Recreation Areas, National Forests, Wildlife Ref-
uges), decree entered. 376 U.S. 340 (1964), amended decree entered, 383 U.S. 268 (1966), modified,
439 U.S. 419 (1979), modified, 460 U.S. 605 (1983).
37. See, e.g., Veeder, Indian Prior and Paramount Rights to the Use of Water. 16 ROCKY MTN.
MIN. L. INST. 631, 635-45 (1971); Shrago, Emerging Indian Water Rights: An Analysis of Recent
Judicial and Legislative Developments, 26 ROCKY MTN. MtN. L. INST. 1105, 1110 n. 19 (1980); see
also, Merrill, Aboriginal Water Rights, 20 NAT. RFs. L 45, 57-59 (1980).
38. For example, the Northern Cheyenne ceded all of their aboriginal territory in Colorado and
Wyoming to the United States. They were later settled in a reservation in Montana, an area in which
they had no aboriginal claim. The reserved water rights of that tribe have not been contested.
Similarly, several Indian tribes were removed from their ancestral homes to the Colorado Indian
Reservation after it was established by Congress in 1865; the reserved water rights associated with
that reservation, and four others, were the subject of the Supreme Court decision of Arizona v.
California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963). The question that this reservation may not have been the aboriginal
territory of the tribes was not even raised.
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court of New Mexico ruled that state law based upon the doctrine of prior
appropriation controlled all the water uses of the Pueblo Indians.39 The
district court certified the question for an interlocutory appeal, and the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals granted the petition and reversed the ruling
of the district court in 1976.'
The 1976 Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals Decision
The court of appeals held that Pueblo water rights were not controlled
by New Mexico prior appropriation law. Citing the Sandoval and Can-
delaria decisions, the court pointed out that the United States had never
surrendered its jurisdiction and control over the Pueblos. The court con-
cluded that the 1924 Pueblo Lands Act and the 1933 Pueblo Compensation
Act were not intended to have any contrary effect upon the water rights
of the Pueblos.4' However, the court of appeals did not attempt to precisely
define the legal basis and scope of those water rights. The court noted
that the United States had relinquished title to Pueblo grant lands by
means of quitclaim deeds which, in the court's opinion, differed from
the creation of a reservation for Indians. The court opined that the de-
cisions recognizing reserved water rights under the Winters doctrine on
Indian reservations created by the United States were, therefore, not
"technically applicable. '" 42
In considering the problem of the origin of Pueblo water rights, the
court recognized that whatever water rights the Pueblos may have had
under previous sovereigns, the United States had agreed to protect them
in the Treaty of Guadalupe Hildalgo. On remand, the court of appeals
directed the district court to receive previously rejected evidence that the
39. See Aamodt I, 537 F.2d 1102, 1104 (10th Cir.) (1976), cert. denied. 429 U.S. 1121 (1977).
In the western portions of the United States, an area of moderate to severe water scarcity, regulation
of the use of surface waters is largely determined under the prior appropriation laws of each State,
Persons gain rights to the continuing use of surface waters not by the fact of ownership of land with
access to water, but by the appropriation of available water through the actual application of that
water to beneficial use. Each appropriation of water is assigned a priority date corresponding to the
date of the initial diversion from the surface system. The water right thus obtained is limited by the
amount of that initial diversion and application to beneficial use.
New water diversions in the river system are only allowable to the extent that there remains
available unappropriated water. In times of water shortages, shortfalls are not shared among water
users. During times of drought a sufficient number of junior users, those with the most recent priority
dates, must cease all diversions of water in order to supply the greatest number of seniors with their
total water appropriation.
The landowner without the benefit of an existing water right can, however, purchase one. A water
right established under state appropriation law may be bought, sold, leased, or, under the appropriate
circumstances, even transferred for use to a new location, all with no change in the original priority
date.
40. Id.
41. id. at 1110-13.
42. Id. at 1111.
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United States had offered on the subject of Spanish and Mexican law.
In addition, the court of appeals rejected the assertion by the State of
New Mexico and the non-Indian defendants that Section 9 of the 1933
Act was adopted merely as a neutral savings clause which was intended
to leave the question of priority of water rights to later judicial decisions.43
Instead, the court used Section 9 to resolve the interrelationship of prior-
ities between Pueblos and non-Indians. Still without addressing the precise
basis for the Pueblos' water rights, whether it was based upon the Winters
decision or rights recognized by a previous sovereign or some alternate
theory, the court concluded that because of Section 9 the water rights of
the Pueblos had to be prior to all non-Indians who had quieted title to
Pueblo land under the 1924 Act."
The court of appeals left the question of the quantification of this first
priority water right for an initial determination in the district court. In
considering the quantification problem the court suggested that the laws
of Spain and Mexico, or the quantification standard adopted in the Winters
line of cases, might have relevance.' 5
The 1985 District Court Decision
After the court of appeals decision, the Pueblos and the United States
believed that the district court would be constrained to conclude that the
Pueblos had a federally reserved water right, or some water right akin to
that, which would have a first priority right to all of the water necessary
to irrigate their remaining irrigable acreage. However, Judge Mechem
denied a summary judgement motion on the issue. He stated that the only
issue before the court of appeals was the very narrow one of whether
state prior appropriation law controlled Pueblo water uses; the applica-
bility of the Winters doctrine had not been an issue on the appeal .4' Judge
Mechem did not reach a decision defining the water rights of the Pueblos
until nine years later in 1985. 47
Pueblo Reserved Water Rights
After the decision by the court of appeals the Pueblos and the United
States argued that the Pueblos had either, or both, a reserved water right
43. Id.
44. Id. at 1113.
45. Id. The later quantification standard, first announced in Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546,
600-01 (1964), is the total "practicably irrigable acreage" [PIA] on the reservation. Prior to Arizona
Court rulings had simply upheld injunctions against off-reservation diversions without directly ad-
dressing the question of the quantity of water reserved. In Arizona the Court agreed that the reservation
of water was intended to satisfy future as well as present Indian needs, and concluded that the only
feasible and fair way this could be measured was by total PIA on the reservation. Id. at 600-01.
The PIA standard is a complex standard involving scientific as well as economic questions such as
the cost of capital to develop irrigation works.
46. New Mexico v. Aamodt, No. 6639 (Memorandum Opinion and Order filed June 10, 1983).
47. Aamodt fl, 618 F. Supp. 993 (D.N.M. 1985).
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under the Winters doctrine or an aboriginal water right that had been
protected under the laws of Spain and Mexico and recognized by the
United States in 1848. In the 1985 district court decision, Judge Mechem
rejected the reserved water right claim on grant lands simply quitclaimed
to the Pueblos in 1858. His reasoning was barely sketched in the opinion.
The gist appears to be that Judge Mechem believed the Winters doctrine
can only apply to lands set apart for the use of Indians by a reservation
of land from the public domain in the technical public lands sense of the
term. He noted that the term "reserved" is a term of art in federal land
law which applies to the federal government's setting aside of land for
a particular purpose, such as for a National Forest or an Indian Reser-
vation.48 He stated that this is the basis for the Winters doctrine of federal
reserved water rights which, therefore, does not apply to Pueblo grant
lands. The suggestion here is that the federal government merely rec-
ognized the Pueblos as the rightful owners of their grant lands pursuant
to a treaty obligation, and no federal purpose to establish an "Indian
reservation" can be inferred. In contrast, when the government "reserves"
federal land for Indian occupancy, the federal purpose to establish an
Indian reservation is either express, because the land is so designated,
or the purpose is easily inferred.
What little is said in the opinion is consistent with this analysis. Judge
Mechem observed that these lands were in the possession and use of the
Pueblos long before the sovereignty of the United States or the adoption
of the Winters doctrine. He concluded that the Pueblos received only
paper title to their property from the 1858 patents, and a Winters right
for these lands would fix an "unrealistic priority."'49
This is a very narrow reading of the implied reservation of water rights
doctrine, one so narrow it would not even cover the original factual
situation which gave rise to the doctrine on the Fort Belknap reservation
in Winters. Those Indians were in possession and use of that territory
before the sovereignty of the United States, and the land was not reserved
out of the federal public domain in the technical public lands sense. The
United States had only what has been termed as the "underlying fee" to
those lands until such time as the government extinguished the Indian
title. The 1888 treaty which created the Fort Belknap Indian reservation
in Winters had only the effect of recognizing the original Indian title under
federal law.
This emphasis on an act of federal reservation of land might be attrib-
uted to two factors: (1) the line of federal reserved water rights cases not
48. Id. at 996.
49. Id. at 1010. Although the opinion used the term "priority," Judge Mechem's objection is
more likely based upon the PIA quantification standard of a Winters water right. See supra, note
45. It would be this quantification standard, coupled with whatever early priority date was assigned
this Winters right, which would seem to make the water right "unrealistic." The water right might
consume the bulk, if not all, of the available water leaving none for the non-Indians.
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involving Indian reservations," and (2) the failure to recognize the di-
versity in how Indian reservations were established. Indian reservations
have been established in a variety ways, and neither a reservation of
public land, nor designation of Indian occupied land as an "Indian res-
ervation" by Congress is essential to reservation status.'
Regarding the first factor, in 1963 the Supreme Court recognized that
the implied reservation of water rights doctrine enunciated in Winters was
equally applicable to other federal enclaves.52 The expression of that
doctrine by the ensuing line of non-Indian reserved water rights cases is
usually regarded as the most definitive statement of the doctrine. The
Supreme Court articulated the basis for such a federal reserved water
right in Cappaert v. United States" as follows:
[Wihen the Federal Government withdraws its land from the public
domain and reserves it for a federal purpose, the Government, by
implication, reserves appurtenant water then unappropriated to the
extent needed to accomplish the purpose of the reservation. In doing
so the United States acquires a reserved right in unappropriated water
which vests on the date of the reservation and is superior to the rights
of future appropriators. Reservation of waters is empowered by the
Commerce Clause, Art. 1, §8, which permits federal regulation of
navigable streams, and the Property Clause, Art. IV, § 3, which
permits federal regulation of federal lands.
In determining whether there is a federally reserved water right
implicit in a federal reservation of public land, the issue is whether
the Government intended to reserve unappropriated and thus available
water. Intent is inferred if the previously unappropriated waters are
necessary to accomplish the purposes for which the reservation was
created.
While the statement of the doctrine in Cappaert limits non-Indian federal
reserved water rights to the creation of reservations out of the public
domain, no such limitation should also be applied to Indian reserved
water rights as well. Indian reservations have been established in nu-
merous ways and only sometimes involved withdrawal of land from the
public domain.
50. See Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S, 128 (1976); United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S,
696 (1978).
51. The Supreme Court decision in United States v. McGowan, 302 U.S. 535 (1938), made it
clear that there is no magic in the designation "reservation." Designation of land purchased for
Indian occupancy under the supervision of the government as a "colony" rather than a "reservation"
does not prevent application of laws relating to Indian Country. Id.
52. Arizona v. California, 373 US. 546, 601 (1963).
53. 426 U.S. 128, 138-39 (1976) (national monument established to protect a particular race of
desert fish).
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At this point I would like to consider if Pueblo grant lands are an
"Indian reservation," and if this designation by the government is even
a necessary element in order to imply the federal reservation of water
rights on behalf of the Pueblos. As mentioned, the creation of Indian
reservations occurred in any number of ways and changed over time as
the United States expanded across the continent. Originally the term
Indian reservation meant any land reserved for Indian occupation after a
tribal cession by treaty regardless of the legal form of the Indian tenure
in the reserved territory. In this regard the United States at times even
undertook to grant a formal patent in fee simple to the tribe concerned. 4
In the 1850s the federal government began the practice of reserving public
lands from entry for Indian occupation. The use of the term "reservation"
from public land law soon merged with the treaty use of the word to form
a simple definition describing "federally protected Indian tribal lands
without any particular dependence on source." 55 Thus, Indian reservations
were set aside from tribal lands by treaty, or were set aside from public
domain lands by either Congress or the Executive. 6
Additionally, Indian reservations were established by purchases of pri-
vate land by either the government or a tribe. For example, some Cherokee
Indians remained in North Carolina, defied removal, and over time pur-
chased land which they ultimately ceded to the United States to be held
in trust for the tribe; today these lands have the recognized status as an
Indian reservation under federal protection.57 Similarly, purchase of land
by the federal government for the occupation of the Mississippi Choctaw
established those lands as an Indian reservation." When the status of
those lands was questioned, the Supreme Court indicated that the critical
element in the inquiry was that the land in question had been validly set
apart for the use of the Indians as such, under the supervision of the
federal government.- 9
54. E.g., Treaty with the Wyandotts, Mar. 17, 1842, art. II, 11 Stat. 581, 582.
55. F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 35 n.66 (R. Strickland ed. 1982).
56. Id. at 473-81, 493-98.
57. See United States v. Lossiah, 537 F.2d 1250, 1251 (4th Cir. 1976).
58. United States v. John, 437 U.S. 634, 649 (1978).
59. Id. (quoting United States v. McGowan, 302 U.S. 535, 539 (1938)).
The question of whether certain land occupied by an Indian tribe is an Indian reservation most
often arises in the context of deciding whether certain land is "Indian Country." The Indian Country
classification is the governing legal term for approaching the allocation of tribal, federal, and state
authority. The present definition was codified in the Indian Major Crimes Act where federal criminal
jurisdiction was tied to the term Indian Country in 1948. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1153, 3242. That Act included
within the definition of Indian Country: (1) "all land within the limits of any Indian Reservation,"
§ 115 t(a), and (2) "all dependent Indian communities," § 1151(b). The wording in section (b) came
directly from the language used in Sandoval and was included to clarify any uncertainty in the
intended scope of the Act.
Recent decisions considering the issue of Indian Country classification have relied exclusively on
the first category of "all Indian reservations" for inclusion of Indian occupied land within the definition
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This broad definition of Indian reservation would easily encompass
Pueblo grant lands. The Congressional action taken to confirm Pueblo
Indian grant lands set apart those lands for Pueblo use and occupation.
Supervision of Indian occupancy is encompassed within the scope of
federal guardianship. The federal guardianship of the Pueblos and their
lands can be traced to the Congressional extension of the Indian Non-
intercourse Act to the Indians of New Mexico in 1851. These protective
federal statutes presumably have always applied to the Pueblos since the
time the statutes were extended to the territory of New Mexico.' The
fact that the Pueblos hold fee simple title would not change the analysis.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has recently applied the above test
to the fee simple lands of the Creek Nation in Oklahoma. The court of
appeals concluded that patented fee title is no obstacle to either reservation
or Indian Country status."'
In sum, neither the fee simple title held by the Pueblos, nor the lack
of a proclamation by Congress that the Pueblo grant lands are an Indian
reservation, nor the absence of a government reservation of public domain
land, are barriers to a classification of Pueblo grant lands as an Indian
reservation. The critical element, as recognized by numerous cases, is
the one of federal supervision, that is the assumption of a guardian-ward
relationship with the tribe by the United States. It is this same factor,
federal guardianship, rather than any "reservation" of land in the technical
public lands sense, which is the basis for the reservation of waters by
the United States for the benefit of Indian tribes on reservations generally.
The United States is presumed to have "intended to deal fairly with
the Indians" and "to reserve waters necessary to make the reservation
liveable. "62 The trust relationship between the tribe and the United States
gives definition to the "federal purpose" in the federal recognition of a
tribal right of occupation, whatever the form of land tenure that occupation
of Indian Country. See, e.g., United States v. John, 437 U.S. 634, 648'(1978) (trust status created
"reservation"); Indian Country U.S.A. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n., 829 F2d 967, 973-76 (10th
Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2870 (1988) (lands held in fee by Creek Nation retain "reservation
status" within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1151(a)); State v. Ortiz, 105 N.M. 308, 731 P.2d 1352
(Ct. App. 1986) (land lying within exterior boundaries of an Indian Pueblo is Indian Country within
the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (a)); Santa Rosa Band of Indians v. Kings County, 532 F2d 655,
657 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038 (1977) (California rancherias are Indian reser-
vations). Rather than define distinct categories sections (a) and (b) of the Act have largely been
completely merged after the broad definition of the term "Indian reservation" suggested by the
Supreme Court in John: any land validly set apart for the use of the Indians as such, under the
supervision of the federal government.
60. See Pueblo of Santa Ana v. Mountain States Tel. 734 F.2d 1402, 1405 (10th Cir. 1984), rev'd
on other grounds, 472 U.S. 237 (1985).
61. The fee title of Creek Indian lands in Oklahoma, like Pueblo grant lands, has never formally
passed to the government to be held in trust for the tribe. Indian Country, U.S.A. v. Oklahoma Tax
Comm'n, 829 F.2d 967, 975-76 (10th Cir. 1987).
62. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 599-600 (1963).
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may take. For these reasons, only in the absence of federal guardianship
would the confirmation of the Pueblo grants in 1858 have carried with it
only whatever rights the United States was obligated to protect under the
treaty of peace with Mexico. Given the assumption of federal guardianship
in 1851, the confirmation of those grants in 1858 necessarily carried
certain additional implications-federally reserved water rights.
Pueblo Water Rights Derived from the Law of Previous Sovereigns
Regarding the water rights of the Pueblos under Spanish and Mexican
law, Judge Mechem adopted most of the findings of the appointed special
master with some modifications. The special master's Conclusion of Law
No. 4 stated that the water rights of the Pueblos were recognized and
protected by Spain and Mexico, and were defined as a prior and paramount
fight to a sufficient quantity to meet their present and future needs. The
Court adopted this finding. The special master's findings continued to
explain the flexible repartimiento system of water allocation used by both
Spain and Mexico. The system was a quasi-judicial administrative pro-
ceeding under which the quantities allocated were never final and could
be changed as needs changed. The system attempted to balance the needs
of all users.
Judge Mechem concluded, however, that the only recorded repartim-
iento in New Mexico involved the Rio de Lucero and the Pueblo of
Taos.63 After examining documents from the Spanish archives which
concerned that repartimiento, he concluded that priority in time of use
and use of water were the paramount factors in determining need and the
right to the use of water under the repartimiento system as it existed in
1823 in New Mexico. In a later unpublished opinion, Judge Mechem
concluded that the mode of "vesting" of a water right under the repar-
timiento system closely approximated the vesting of water rights under
prior appropriation law, that is by fixed occupation of territory and use
of water.'
This analysis of the laws of Spain and Mexico changes the relevancy
of prior law from a type of choice of law analysis. The court will not
attempt to apply eighteenth and nineteenth century Spanish and Mexican
law as a means of allocating water rights between competing users. As
used by this court, those prior laws simply become the basis for an
acquired water right which vests in much the same manner as a vested
water right under the present New Mexico prior appropriation system.
63. Aamodt H, 618 F. Supp. at 999.
64. New Mexico ex rel. Reynolds v. Aamodt, No. 6639 civil (Memorandum Opinion and Order
filed February 2, 1987, at 14).
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Pueblo Aboriginal Water Rights
Judge Mechem's 1985 opinion considered at some length the Pueblos'
claim to aboriginal rights in their grant lands and concluded that Pueblo
original Indian occupation and use rights were not terminated by the
United States, at least not until passage of the 1924 Pueblo Lands Act.
His opinion accepted the proposition that the Pueblos came into the United
States with an aboriginal right to the use of water, a right recognized
under the law of Spain and Mexico, and with a longstanding priority
associated with that use right as well. His major holding in this regard
was:
This line of cases [citations omitted] establishes that the Pueblos
have aboriginal title, Indian rights or original Indian rights to their
lands and the use of them including appurtenances.
The Pueblos have the prior right to use all of the water of the
stream system necessary for their domestic uses and that necessary
to irrigate their lands, saving and excepting the land ownership and
appurtenant water rights terminated by the operation of the 1924
Pueblo Lands Act ....
In using this approach Judge Mechem grounded Pueblo water use rights
in the federal law of aboriginal title. Original Indian title gives an Indian
tribe the right to exclusive occupation and use of their aboriginal land
until that title is extinguished by the United States. However, the courts
have barely developed the contours of aboriginal use rights to natural
resources, especially natural resources not under the tribe's exclusive
control. One reason for the lack of court development is because the use
rights of Indian tribes are almost always defined in terms of treaty rights,
or influenced by other factors such as the unambiguous creation of an
Indian reservation by the government. The scope of aboriginal use rights
to natural resources such as fisheries, oil and gas, or water have almost
exclusively been defined within that treaty or Indian reservation context.
In the absence of those two factors an aboriginal use right might be
defined with wide latitude.
This much of Judge Mechem's opinion was controlled by the Tenth
Circuit's opinion in 1976. That opinion recognized that whatever the legal
basis of the Pueblos' water rights, the Pueblos would obtain a priority
date for their water allocation superior to non-Indians who had established
title to Pueblo grant lands. Pueblo water priority was "time immemorial."
However, Judge Mechem had complete latitude in selecting a method to
65. Aamodt U, 618 F. Supp. at 1009, 1010.
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quantify the Pueblo aboriginal water right. He did so in a single sentence:
"The acreage to which this priority applies is all acreage irrigated by the
Pueblos between 1846 and 1924." '
This standard of "historic irrigated acreage" is not the amount of
irrigated acreage in past historic times, before the advent of the Spanish,
nor does this quantification approximate the total irrigable acreage re-
maining to the Pueblos. The 1846 to 1924 standard was selected with
the idea that acreage under irrigation in 1846-when the United States
first took control of the territory-was protected by "federal law including
the Treaty of Guadalupe Hildalgo. ' '67 So to the extent the Pueblos had
exercised their right to the use of water in 1846, either based upon
aboriginal title rights or Spanish and Mexican law, the court would rec-
ognize the right to that 1846 allocation of water as having become vested
in the Pueblos. Historic uses before 1846, whether greater or lesser in
amount, become irrelevant.
Judge Mechem noted that this aboriginal water right, as modified by
Spanish and Mexican law, included the right to irrigate new land in
response to need, and this right continued when the Pueblos were brought
under the control of the United States. So in the court's view the Pueblos
might vest in themselves rights to additional water allotments based upon
increased historical irrigation use after 1846.6" However, Judge Mechem
viewed the 1924 Pueblo Lands Act as terminating the Pueblo aboriginal
water right; that is, the Pueblos were entitled to a water allotment for
water use which had vested up to that point, but the 1924 Act fixed the
measure of Pueblo aboriginal water rights to acreage irrigated as of that
date. 69 This limitation was based upon the legal effect of the 1924 Act
which gave non-Indians their "first legal water rights" within the original
Pueblo grant.
The district court thus implicitly held that the practical effect of the
1924 Pueblo Lands Act was to extinguish the exercise of the aboriginal
water right on lands not irrigated before passage of the 1924 Act, and
that such an effect was the presumed intent of Congress. The net effect
of this quantification standard is the limitation of the scope of this federally
based Pueblo water right to rights resembling those which would vest
under state prior appropriation law, an approach repudiated in the Tenth
Circuit opinion.
66. Id. at 1010.
67. Id.
68. "The Pueblo aboriginal water right, as modified by Spanish and Mexican law, included the
right to irrigate new land in response to need. Acreage brought under irrigation between 1846 and
1924 was thus also protected by federal law." Id.
69. "The 1924 Act, which gave the non-Pueblos within the Pueblo four-square-leagues their first
legal water rights, also fixed the measure of Pueblo water rights to acreage irrigated as of that date."
Id.
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Also implicit in this standard is the conclusion that the Pueblos, after
1924, will have to rely on state law in order to secure additional water
when Pueblo uses exceed the 1846 to 1924 historic level of use. In a
unpublished Memorandum Opinion and Order, Judge Mechem made this
proposition express. He stated that his position is that the Pueblos will
have to turn to state law and procedures to secure additional water rights
once their water uses exceed their "federal rights." '7
Subsequent Court Proceedings
After the 1985 opinion, both the Pueblos and the non-Indian defendants
again petitioned the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals to hear an interlocutory
appeal. The non-Indian defendants claimed the recognition of an aborig-
inal water right was erroneous and disputed any Pueblo use right based
upon aboriginal title. Those defendants argued that any such use fight
was extinguished by the 1924 Pueblo Lands Act, and, moreover, that the
Indians of the southwest had no aboriginal title claims to land despite the
assumption of Supreme Court cases that aboriginal possession in the
Mexican Cession would be respected by the United States. 7' The Pueblos
contested the denial of quantifying their water rights on their remaining
land by the practicable irrigable acreage standard of Arizona v. Califor-
nia, 2 and the limitation of the historic use standard to acreage irrigated
between 1846 and 1924. The Tenth Circuit denied the petition in Decem-
ber of 1987.
In analyzing the results of a water rights adjudication it is helpful to
understand the factual situation in practical terms: who is upstream or
downstream, what is the quantity of water available for the contesting
70. New Mexico ex rel. Reynolds v. Aamodt. No. 6639 civil (Memorandum Opinion and Order
filed December 1, 1986). The memorandum opinion cited as support for this proposition United
States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 702 (1978), a non-Indian reserved water rights case, wherein
Justice Rehnquist discussed federal deference to state water law.
Judge Mechem, in his 1985 opinion also cited another non-Indian reserved water fight case for
support for the position he adopted concerning the scope of the Pueblo aboriginal water fight over
groundwater. He cited Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128 (1976), as supporting the conclusion
that Pueblo aboriginal water rights extend to both surface streams and the hydrologically connected
groundwater. Aamodt HI, 618 F. Supp. 993, 1010 (D.NM. 1985). While Cappaert does suggest
that a federal reserve water rights claim might extend to groundwater, it does not address the scope
of an aboriginal fight to the use of groundwater. The latter claim is based upon aboriginal title, that
is, on a property interest in the overlying lands of the reservation.
The court's theory used in Aamodt ( to extend the Pueblo aboriginal water right to hydrologically
connected groundwater will likely result in a court injunction against Pueblo groundwater withdrawals
once total Pueblo water use exceeds the 1846-1924 historic use standard. This would be the expected
result under the groundwater use laws of the state of New Mexico. See City of Albuquerque v.
Reynolds, 71 N.M. 428, 379 P.2d 73 (1962). As a matter of federal law it would seem to be an
open question.
71. See, e.g., United States, as guardian of the Hualapai Indians of Arizona v. Santa Fe Pacific
R.R., 314 U.S. 339, 346 (1941).
72. See supra note 45.
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claimants. The streams involved in this adjudication are not large; only
a limited supply of water is available seasonally. With this in mind, one
can see that the motivation to severely limit the first priority water al-
location of the Pueblos may have been a result of the recognition in the
1924 Pueblo Lands Act and 1933 Pueblo Compensation Act that the
Pueblos had actually lost the right to some quantum of water in addition
to losing land.73 This suggests that the non-Indians at the same time gained
a water right in practical terms. However, if the Pueblos retained a first
priority water right for either (1) all of their remaining irrigable acreage,
or (2) all of their remaining historically irrigated acreage using an unlim-
ited historic time standard, then the Pueblo allocation might consume all
.the available water in the stream system. The non-Indians, in practical
terms, would have gained nothing but land, despite the assumptions to
the contrary in the 1924 and 1933 Acts. They might only hope that the
Pueblos would leave the water in the stream unused.
Viewed from this perspective, the 1985 opinion might be regarded as
an attempt to indirectly effect an apportionment of scarce available water
between the Pueblos and the non-Indian users.74 However, the legal stan-
73. See H.R. REP. No. 123, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., at 3 (1933).
74. Other cases concerned with Indian aboriginal use rights to natural resources do suggest that
at some point, because of competition between non-Indians and the Indians exercising their aboriginal
use rights, an allocation of a scarce resource is appropriate. The first suggestion of this view came
in the Supreme Court's decision in Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing
Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658 (1979) [hereinafter Fishing Vessel] (off-reservation treaty fishing rights).
There, citing Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963), a reserved water rights case, the Court
stated that:
Indian treaty rights to a natural resource that was once thoroughly and exclusively
exploited by the Indians secures so much as, but not more than, is necessary to provide
the Indians with a livelihood-that is to say a moderate living.
Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 686. The Court proceeded to approve of the 50/50 allocation of the
fisheries between the treaty and non-treaty fishermen. The need for this allocation was presumably
the scarcity of the natural resource.
Cases decided after the Washington Fisheries decision have drawn several interesting conclusions
from the above quoted language. In United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394 (9th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 467 U.S. 1252 (1984), a case recognizing an aboriginal water right with a time immemorial
priority date in favor of the Klamath tribe of Indians, the court stated that:
Implicit in this 'moderate living' standard is the conclusion that Indian tribes are not
generally entitled to the same level of exclusive use and exploitation of a natural
resource that they enjoyed at the time they entered into the treaty reserving their interest
in the resource, unless of course, no lesser level will supply them with a moderate
living.
Id. at 1415. The recognition in Adair of a tribally reserved aboriginal water right, to certain minimum
levels of in-stream flows, was thus limited by the Supreme Court's "moderate living" standard.
This "moderate living" standard, to date, has not been judicially defined and is the subject of
some debate. Morisset, The Legal Standards for Allocating the Fisheries Resources, 22 IDAHO L.
REv. 609, 613 (1986) (state of Washington requested a determination in 1980, but subsequently
dropped the request). One view is that the standard was developed for use when, because of scarcity,
a need for allocation of resources is required; the standard then guarantees so much of the resource
to the tribe as will provide them with a moderate living. Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior
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dard adopted by the court to reach this result may prove to be an un-
workable one. The standard creates a number of problems which the 1985
opinion did not address, but which would soon be raised. The most
troublesome is that the United States had used the funds it had awarded
the Pueblos under the 1933 Pueblo Compensation Act to purchase ad-
ditional land for the Pueblos, mostly inside the boundaries of the original
grants, and to construct extensive new irrigation projects in the years
after 1933, in order to supply additional water to the remaining Pueblo
lands.7" The 1846 to 1924 historic use standard seems ill-suited to define
the water rights of the Pueblos on these replacement lands, or on lands
brought under irrigation by federal irrigation projects after 1933.
Historic Use Between 1846 and 1924
After the 1985 Opinion, the first problem addressed by the court was
to determine the historic irrigated acreage of the Pueblos between 1846
and 1924. The special master in this case, who had been appointed in
1967, had held hearings on the issue of historic irrigated acreage in 1981.
But, his findings did not correspond to the definition given historic use
in the 1985 opinion. The special master withdrew because of ill health
without ever revising his findings. Judge Mechem himself made a de-
termination of historic irrigation on the basis of evidence in the record.
Judge Mechem rejected the total of 3,792 presently owned acres which
the Pueblos claimed came within the court's historic use standard,16 a
figure which roughly corresponded to the special master's finding given
a wider time frame." He relied instead on a 1932 report by Jose Armijo,
Chippewa Indians v. Wisconsin, 653 F. Supp. 1420, 1434 (W.D. Wis. 1987) (finding no necessity
for limiting off-reservation hunting and fishing at the present time).
The relevance of these cases to the Aamodt litigation is that they are all concerned with the
quantification of aboriginal use rights, including use of water, and suggest a workable framework
for the analysis. As for the quantification of federally reserved Indian water rights, the Supreme
Court has already adopted the practicable irigable acreage standard, and has rejected any allocation
based upon other factors or doctrines such as equitable apportionment. Arizona v. California, 373
U.S. at 565, 460 U.S. at 626 (declining to relitigate the irrigable acreage question in light of Fishing
Vessel Ass'n). However, given the necessity for allocation, the moderate living standard, as applied
to aboriginal use rights to scarce natural resources, would seem to address the future needs of the
Indians in much the same fashion as the practicable irrigable acreage standard.
75. See Act of May 31, 1933, ch. 45, § 1, 48 Stat. 108; BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, PUEBLO
INDIAN LAND STATUS 21 (1940).
76. The alleged total of 3,792 acres was based upon anthropological, archeological and soil
science evidence which the court concluded was too imprecise. New Mexico ex rel. Reynolds v.
Aamodt, No. CIV-6639M (Memorandum and Opinion filed May 1, 1987).
77. The special master had concluded that the Nambe, Pojoaque, San Ildefonso and Tesuque
Pueblos at one time had totals of 2,410 acres, 2,058 acres, 2,200 acres and 1,760 acres respectively
which had been irrigated by ditches used by the four Tewa Pueblos from pre-historic times. Deducting
for tracts now owned by non-Indians the figures were reduced to 1,353 acres, 1,486 acres, 614 acres
and 368 acres respectively for a total of 3,841 acres. New Mexico ex rel. Reynolds v. Aamodt, No.
CIV-6639M (Special Master's Findings of Fact).
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a special assistant to the U.S. Attorney General. Jose Armijo had con-
ducted extensive field surveys of the Pueblo irrigation works as they
existed in 1931. Judge Mechem concluded that since the survey was done
shortly after the 1846-1924 time period, Jose Armijo was in the best
position to determine the Pueblo historic irrigated acreage.
The Armijo report surveyed two classes of land in Pueblo possession
and distinguished between "acreage cultivated and irrigated in 1931" and
"acreage irrigable but not cultivated during recent years." Accepting the
proposition that the Pueblos had actually irrigated more land during the
1880s and 1890s than in the early 1900s, Judge Mechem included lands
which Armijo identified as cultivated only in recent years as being within
the court's historic use standard. The following table is a summary of
the survey of those lands within the four Pueblos which had never passed
into non-Indian hands, and which the Pueblos had in their possession in
1931:
Irrigated* Irrigable"* Total Acres
San Ildefonso 148 124 272
Tesuque 164 77.5 241.5
Nambe 133 195 328
Pojoaque 0 0 0
Total 841.5
*cultivated and irrigated in 1931.
**irrigable but not cultivated by the Indians in recent years.
Armijo reported that, as of 1931, the Pueblos had recovered the fol-
lowing lands by quiet title action pursuant to the Pueblo Lands Act of
1924. In other words, these were lands occupied by non-Indians who,
for one reason or another, had been removed by 1931. The following
table is a summary of the survey of those recovered lands within the four
Pueblos which the Pueblos had in their possession in 1931.
Irrigated* Irrigable** Total Acres
San Ildefonso 91.144 2.328 93.472
Tesuque 0 0 0
Nambe 60.39 38.871 99.261
Pojoaque 25.931 33.863 59.794
Total 252.527
*cultivated and irrigated in 1931.
**irrigable but not cultivated by the Indians in recent years.
The court concluded that the Armijo survey was the best evidence of
the number of acres of Pueblo grant lands irrigated between 1846 and
1924, and which remained in Pueblo possession in 1931; the court com-
bined the above two categories and settled on a total of 1,094.027 acres
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as the measure of the first priority water allotment of the four Indian
Pueblos.7"
The court corroborated this finding of 1,094 irrigated acres with certain
other government surveys conducted about 1925. The court also noted
that the recorded Indian populations of the four Pueblos were approxi-
mately the same in 1850 as in 1924."9 This supported the conclusion that
the Pueblos' 1924 irrigated acreage, as surveyed by Armijo, was com-
parable to their 1846 irrigated acreage.
Lands which were lost by the Pueblos pursuant to the 1924 Act were
not included in the Armijo survey, and this is not a defect which invalidates
the court's use of the Armijo report. Irrigation between 1846 and 1924
on lands which passed to non-Indians is of no consequence, since those
water rights were lost when the title passed. The court's historic use
standard is restricted to remaining lands. However, after 1933 the United
States purchased replacement lands, mostly within the boundaries of the
original grants.8 0 These lands were acquired for the purpose of replacing
both lost land and water rights. The final total of 1,094 acres, as noted
by Judge Mechem, does not include water rights associated with replace-
ment lands."
Replacement Lands
One legal basis for Pueblo water rights on replacement lands might be
a federal reservation, at the time of acquisition, of sufficient available
water to irrigate the total practicably irrigable acreage of these lands. This
78. New Mexico ex rel. Reynolds v. Aamodt, No. CIV-6639M (Memorandum Opinion and Order
filed May I, 1987); id., (Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law filed September 9,
1987). The Armijo report dealt only with total acreage and did not identify the location of the irrigated
parcels with maps.
A comparison of the special master's findings, see supra note 77, to the results of using the 1846-
1924 historic use standard, see text, shows considerable variation between the Pueblos in the amount
of retained pre-historic irrigated acreage which came within the court's historic use standard. Nearly
all of 368 retained acres in the Tesuque Pueblo, which the special master found were under irrigation
from pre-historic times, came within the court's standard. Only 60 of the 1,486 retained acres in
the Pojoaque Pueblo which were under irrigation from pre-historic times were similarly included.
See supra note 77 for the rejected findings of the special master regarding historic use of water by
the four Tewa Pueblos from pre-historic times.
79. An 1850 United States census reported a total of 417 Indians in the four Pueblos, New Mexico
ex rel. Reynolds v. Aamodt, No. CIV-6639M (Memorandum Opinion and Order filed May I. 1987);
a 1925 publication by a Dr. Hewett, Director of the School of American Research, reported a total
of 336 Indians in 1924. Id.
80. As of April I, 1940, Nambe, Pojoaque and San lidefonso Pueblos had reacquired 95, 25 and
328 acres respectively within the boundaries of the original grants. Tesuque Pueblo had reacquired
319 acres outside their grant. Supra note 75, at 21.
81. Additionally, water rights associated with other designated "reservation" lands, lands set
apart for Pueblo use and occupation out of the public domain by Congress or Executive Order, must
be added to the figure as well. Supra note 78.
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would be a federally reserved water rights claim based upon the express
intention of the United States to acquire these lands for the purpose of
replacing lost Pueblo water rights.82 A more restrictive approach might
simply be the recovery of whatever aboriginal water rights were lost, on
each specific tract, and which were then later reacquired with the land.
In that case, the Pueblos would have to demonstrate that such a water
right existed in the first instance using the historic use standard as defined
by the Court. Judge Mechem has taken the latter approach. For the
quantification of water rights on acquired lands, Judge Mechem set forth
the following guidelines: (1) acquired lands must be within the boundaries
of the original Pueblo grants, and (2) the quantity of replacement water
rights is to be measured by the 1846 to 1924 historic irrigated acreage
on the acquired lands.8 3
Under this formula, when the United States acquired land for the
Pueblos outside the grant boundaries, or land within the original grant
which could not be shown to have been irrigated by the Pueblos between
1846 and 1924, possibly because the land was occupied by non-Indians,
the United States acquired land without water rights. In this instance, the
quantification method ignores the intention of Congress to secure water
rights in addition to land when the United States used the funds allocated
in the 1933 Act to replace Pueblo lands and water rights which had been
divested. This was the express purpose for the use of the appropriations
made in the 1933 Pueblo Compensation Act.
However, if the reacquired land could be shown to have been histor-
ically irrigated by the Pueblos, the Pueblo water allotment would be
adjusted accordingly and assigned an immemorial priority date. Implicit
in this approach is the idea that the Pueblo aboriginal water right, which
was extinguished on this parcel when title was quieted in a non-Indian,
was revived by the United States when it purchased the parcel for the
benefit of the Pueblos.
Another potential problem is the likelihood that a number of the tracts
that the Pueblos assert were acquired as replacement lands will be chal-
lenged due to the source of funds used in the acquisition. These lands,
and replacement lands outside the original grant boundaries, will form
yet additional categories of Pueblo lands with further distinct issues con-
cerning appurtenant water rights.
82. Reservation of water rights by the government is empowered by the Commerce Clause, U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, which permits regulation of navigable streams, as well as the Property
Clause, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2, which permits federal regulation of federal lands. Cappaert
v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 138 (1975).
83. New Mexico ex ret. Reynolds v. Aamodt, No. CIV-6639M (Memorandum Opinion and Order
filed May 1, 1987).
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Post 1933 Irrigation Works
In the 1933 Pueblo Compensation Act, Congress approved the use of
the compensation funds for the construction of irrigation works for the
benefit of Pueblo lands. Typically, when the United States constructs
irrigation works upon Indian lands, courts do not attribute any new Indian
water rights to the construction project or subsequent use of that water
in irrigation: the irrigation project would fall within the pre-existing scope
of the Indian tribe's reserved water rights. Here the court has ruled that
reserved rights do not exist, and that the right to put new land into
irrigation based upon the aboriginal water right was terminated as of
1924. In the present controversy, Judge Mechem's position is that the
post-1933 irrigation works secure replacement water rights in much the
same manner as with the acquisition of replacement lands. He states that
the quantification of water rights attributable to replacement irrigation
works must follow the same two step process as for acquired lands.84
Certain maps which show historically irrigated acreage on a tract by tract
basis are to be used in the quantification process."5
This approach may have the effect of replacing water rights which were
never lost. The court's historic use standard seems to be the criteria set
down for the quantification of water rights associated with these projects.
But, if the land was historically irrigated, the acreage has already been
taken into account in the earlier quantification scheme, and the court's
approach for post-1933 irrigation projects adds that measure a second
time. Perhaps this is what the court has in mind.
The court's quantification method also leads to the conclusion that if
the post-1933 irrigation project served land not shown to have been
historically irrigated, then no new water rights were secured or would be
otherwise associated with the project. Implicit in this is the idea that the
United States may have lacked a legal basis for the construction of those
post-1933 irrigation projects, at least to the extent that the project in-
creased the total Pueblo water use beyond the 1846-1924 historic allo-
cation. It is difficult to assume that this is what the United States had in
mind. At this point there is considerable disagreement among all the
parties concerning the water rights associated with these post-1933 proj-
ects. Judge Mechem will have to clarify his ruling in the unpublished
1987 Memorandum in order to resolve the matter.
84. Id.
85. These maps were compiled in 1980 by Eulid Martinez, the Chief of the Hydrographic Survey
Section of the New Mexico State Engineer's Office. Since Armijo's map are unavailable, the maps
which Martinez prepared in 1980 have been accepted as the best evidence of the locations of specific
irrigation ditches and lands irrigated by the Pueblos prior to 1924. Id.
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Reservation Lands
Judge Mechem also ruled on the water rights associated with certain
lands set aside for Pueblo use by Executive Order or Congressional leg-
islation out of federal public domain lands.' The court agreed in its 1985
opinion that these reservation lands have Winters rights. Interestingly,
the court also concluded that if the Pueblos can show that these lands
were occupied as part of their aboriginal territory, then the water rights
associated with those lands will be entitled to an immemorial priority
date. 7 And, rather than limit the acreage to which this first priority water
right applies to some type of historical use standard, Judge Mechem
indicated that the total practicable irrigable acreage [PIA] on these res-
ervations shall have an immemorial priority date. In that regard, he noted
that PIA is the general water measure of "reservations. "While the PIA
involved here have not been determined and may not be large, this is a
somewhat unexpected and generous decision by the court. The ruling
certainly has important ramifications for some of the other Indian Pueblos
with large amounts of federally reserved land which may have greater
amounts of acreage within the PIA standard.
Two recent court decisions in other jurisdictions, United States v. Adair,"
and State ex rel. Greely v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes
of the Flathead Reservation,9 have also recognized an immemorial prior-
ity in reservation waters for pre-existing water uses. In both of these
cases, the water use involved fisheries and the quantification of the water
right was fixed by the minimum level of stream flow necessary to maintain
those fisheries. In Aamodt, where the pre-existing water use was in ag-
riculture, the use of the PIA quantification standard coupled with an
immemorial priority is considerably more expansive and suggests conflicts
with the prior rulings of the court. In Adair and Greely, those two courts
were careful to point out that the water right having an immemorial priority
was a pre-existing aboriginal right which was merely recognized or con-
firmed by the action of the government. This would also seem to be the
basis of Judge Mechem's ruling regarding immemorial priority on res-
ervation lands that are shown to be part of the Pueblos' aboriginal territory.
However, in his previous rulings he has not quantified the aboriginal
86. Nambe Pueblo possesses 6,444 acres of land set aside by the Executive Order in 1902. Exec.
Order of Sept. 4, 1902, 111 Kappler 687. San Ildefonso Pueblo possesses lands set aside for grazing
purposes by Congressional Act in 1961. Act of Sept. 14, 1961, 75 Stat. 500. The San lldefonso
Pueblo also possesses considerable other land reserved by Congress in 1929 and by Executive Order
in 1939. Act of Feb. II, 1929, ch. 174, 45 Stat. 1161; Exec. Order No. 8255, 3 C. F.R. 582 (1934-
1943 comp.)
87. Supra note 83,
88. 723 F.2d 1394, 1414 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1252 (1984).
89. 712 P.2d 754, 764 (Mont. 1985).
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Pueblo water right by means of the PIA standard. For that reason, the
scope of water right the court has recognized is considerably greater than
the scope of the Pueblo aboriginal water right as previously defined by
the court. The use of the PIA standard on reservation lands can only be
justified by the action of the United States in taking this land out of the
public domain. However, the reservation of some quantum of water by
the United States is limited by the availability of unappropriated water
at the time the reservation is made. Since the court's ruling does not
merely recognize a pre-existing immemorial right to the use of some
quantum of water, but relies upon the action of the United States, the
factor of the availability of water at the time the reservation land was set
aside is relevant and seems to have been ignored-the United States
cannot create a reserved water right with the reservation of federal land
which is senior to existing users.' °
I would conclude that in order to hold that the Pueblos have a federally
reserved water right with an immemorial priority, quantified by the PIA
standard, the court must first define the Pueblo aboriginal water fight to
be identical in scope. In this way the United States is merely recognizing
an existing right and not creating new rights which ignore the availability
of unappropriated water.
There is some doubt Judge Mechem actually intends to follow the
above analysis and award an immemorial priority for the total PIA of the
reservation lands. The suggestion comes from his directive to use evidence
of the Pueblo ditches that existed in 1846 on these lands as "tools for
quantifying" PIA. This implies that he might limit the immemorial water
right by using the 1846-1924 historic irrigation standard. This approach
might be consistent with the interpretation that the United States is merely
recognizing a pre-existing right to the use of the water, and the historical
use standard defines the scope of that pre-existing right. However, even
taking this approach, the Pueblos should also have a second priority date
assigned for the remaining acreage on the reservation which comes within
the PIA standard. That reserved water right was created on the date the
lands were set aside for Pueblo use out of public domain lands.
90. Adair and Greely, both recognizing an immemorial priority date for pre-existing uses, suggest
that this priority problem should be approached by assigning two priority dates for Indian reservations
where pre-existing water use is shown. See Greely, 712 P.2d at 763-65. The pre-existing use, based
upon aboriginal use rights, should be assigned a priority date of time immemorial, while the new
agricultural use should be assigned a priority date corresponding to the time of the creation of the
Indian reservation. Id. The quantification of the reserved right for new uses would be the PIA standard
adopted in Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 600 (1963), while the aboriginal use right, with an
immemorial priority date, would be limited by the moderate living standard enunciated in Washington
Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 433 U.S. 658, 686 (1979). See Greely, 712 P.2d at 764-65; Adair, 723 F.2d
at 1415; See also supra note 74.
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CONCLUSION
This is the development of the Aamodt litigation to the present. Even
after 22 years of litigation and the publication of two court opinions
numerous unresolved issues remain. These issues will consume consid-
erable time before the court will be able to issue a final decision. When
that decision is made there is no doubt that it will be appealed by the
United States and the Pueblos, and perhaps even by the State of New
Mexico and the non-Indian defendants who will contest the recognition
of an aboriginal water use right.
Looking at the course of the litigation so far, I would suggest that the
basic premise of the 1985 opinion, that the practical effect of the 1924
Pueblo Lands Act was to extinguish the Pueblo aboriginal water rights
on lands not irrigated before passage of the Act, has created complex
questions concerning the scope of Pueblo water rights after 1933. Also,
the method Judge Mechem used to define the scope of Pueblo water rights
may mean that this decision will not settle the issue of the controlling
water rights law for the other Indian Pueblos located in the Rio Grande
basin. 9 ' The 1846-1924 historic use standard is tied to vesting of Pueblo
land and water rights in non-Indians. A close reading of the 1985 opinion
suggests that the factor which fixed the measure of Pueblo use of water
to acreage irrigated as of 1924 is the practical effect of the 1924 Act, not
the passage of the Pueblo Lands Act per se.92 If a Pueblo was unaffected
by the 1924 Act, because that particular Pueblo lost no grant lands to
non-Indians, presumably the right to irrigate new land continued as be-
fore, since there was no vesting of Pueblo grant land in non-Pueblos
which "fixed" the measure of the water right.
In a number of the remaining Pueblos no land was lost as a result of
the Pueblo Lands Act.93 While Congress may have allocated funds in
91. At this time there are seven other cases involving the water rights of eight other Indian
Pueblos, four in the federal district court for New Mexico and three in the state courts. New Mexico
v. Abbott, U.S. Dist. Ct. Nos. CIV-7488C and CIV-8650C (San Juan, Santa Clara and San Ildefonso
Pueblos); New Mexico v. Abeyta, U.S. Dist. Ct. Nos. CIV-7896C and CIV-7939C (Taos Pueblo);
New Mexico v. Aragon, U.S. Dist. Ct. Nos. CIV-7941C (San Juan Pueblo); United States v.
Abousleman, U.S. Dist. Ct. Nos. CIV-83-1041C (Jemez, Santa Ana and Zia Pueblos); Anaya v.
Public Service Company, Santa Fe Co. No. 43,347 (Cochiti Pueblo); New Mexico v. Kerr-McGee
Corp., Cibola Co. Nos. CB-83-190CV and CB-83-220-CV (Acoma and Laguna Pueblos); Gallup
v. United States, McKinley Co. No. CV-84-164 (Zuni Pueblo). The commencement of proceedings
was held in abeyance with the understanding that the Aamodt litigation would take the lead for the
purposes of determining the controlling law. These cases are now in their early stages of proceedings
as the interest in avoiding duplicative litigation eventually gave way to due process concerns.
92. "The 1924 Act, which gave non-Pueblos within the Pueblo four-square-leagues their first
legal water rights, also fixed the measure of Pueblo water rights to acreage irrigated as of that date."
Aamodt II, 618 F. Supp. 993, 1010 (D.N.M. 1985).
93. At least the Acoma, Laguna, Santa Ana, Zia, and Zuni Pueblos seem to have lost no grant
lands to non-Indians. BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, supra note 75 at 18.
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1933 for the construction of new irrigation works on these Pueblos, there
was no compensation given for lost land and water rights, nor were lands
acquired to replace lost land and water rights. Under those circumstances,
these Pueblos will argue that even if Aamodt was correctly decided, the
case has no application to them which would limit their Pueblo aboriginal
right to "irrigate new land in response to need."
ED NEWVILLE
